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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



② 3 p.

① Operational rpt. material ending 1 Jan 61.

IN REPLY REFER TO

① 18 DACSFOR

AGAM-P (M) (25 Apr 69) FOR OT-UT-691329

29 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, ~~Regraded Unclassified~~ (U.S.)
1969 (U)

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Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance
with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should
be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days
of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate
benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and
may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

AVCA CRB-IO

15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 (PCS: CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O,
APO San Francisco 96384
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOC-DST,
APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-GT,
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (C) Section I - Operations: Significant Activities.

a. ACoS, Personnel and Administration

(1) Personnel Management:

(a) Colonel Albert Newton commanded from 1 November 1968 through 2 December 1968; total days commanded - 32 days. Colonel Frank A. Gleason, Jr commanded from 3 December 1968 through 31 January 1969; total days commanded - 60 days.

(b) The authorized and assigned military strength of the command decreased sharply during the period as a result of the reassignment of the Tuy Hoa-Vung Ro Bay complex to Qui Nhon SUPCOM, unit inactivations, and implementation of the MTDA of the US Army Depot Cam Ranh. Following is a summary of authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and end of the period:

	1 Nov 68		31 Jan 69		Net Change	
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>
OFF	551	527	482	437	- 69	- 90
WO	131	124	131	115	0	- 9
ENL	<u>11,434</u>	<u>9,825</u>	<u>9,114</u>	<u>8,792</u>	<u>-2,320</u>	<u>-1,033</u>
TOTAL	<u>12,116</u>	<u>10,476</u>	<u>9,727</u>	<u>9,344</u>	<u>-2,389</u>	<u>-1,132</u>

(c) The transfer of Tuy Hoa-Vung Ro Bay and some minor changes in the civilianization program reduced the command's number of civilianization spaces from 1162 to 986. Hiring rates are declining but are still adequate to keep this program ahead of schedule. By the end of the period 928

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employees had been hired, which places the command at 94% of its civilianization goal. However, the skilled labor market in Cam Ranh Bay continues to be a problem. In order to achieve its civilianization objectives and employ the labor available in the area, it was necessary to down grade 32 positions from a skilled or semi-skilled category to an unskilled type of job. As of the end of the period 98% of unskilled jobs and 100% of semi-skilled jobs had been filled, whereas, only 32% of the skilled positions had been filled.

(d) The command's local national direct hire space authorization was decreased from 2360 spaces to 2146 spaces. The majority of the lost spaces resulted from the reassignment of Tuy Hoa and Vung Ro Bay to Qui Nhon GUPCOM. Included in the local national direct hire authorization are 1328 spaces in the US Army Depot's MTDA. Of these only 863 had been filled by the end of the period. The large majority of the vacant spaces in depot require employees with some degree of skill. The limited labor market in the area is making these jobs increasingly difficult to fill.

(e) Because of the limited abilities of the local nationals hired, it has been necessary to establish formal courses of instruction. These were started in early October 1968 and the first classes completed in late October 1968. The instruction has been divided between language training and skills training. As of the end of the period, 14 courses of instruction had been conducted with 249 employees completing the courses. Another 5 courses are in progress with 108 employees enrolled.

(2) Personnel Services Division:

(a) Education Center facilities at Nha Trang and Cam Ranh were expanded during the quarter by the addition of relocatable classroom facilities. Two additional classrooms and a testing room became operational at Nha Trang on 13 January 1969; four additional classrooms and one language laboratory became operational at Cam Ranh on 2 January 1969.

(b) As part of the command program against drug abuse, a series of 36 classes on the psychological and medical effects of marijuana and drugs was presented during the week of 6-10 January 1969 to 5267 troops stationed in the Cam Ranh Bay area by a psychiatrist from the 43d Medical Group. Additionally, classes by CID agents on the detection and legal aspects of marijuana and drugs were also scheduled by participating units.

(c) Over 15,000 Christmas Gift Kits (Ditty Bags) were distributed by the American Red Cross to units throughout the USARPACOM-CRB area of responsibility in coordination with this headquarters. In addition to these gifts contributed by Red Cross Chapters throughout the United States, the citizens of Charlotte, North Carolina contributed transistor radios, fruit cakes and candy bars which were distributed to troops of this command serving at the LSA's. Two hundred Christmas trees donated by the State of Washington were also distributed to units within the USARPACOM-CRB area.

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(d) The duty hour policy for this headquarters and subordinate units was revised effective 20 November 1968. Prescribed duty hours are 0730 to 1830 seven days a week with a minimum 60 hour work week required of all military personnel.

(e) Upon recommendation of the Support Command Morale Council the following programs were initiated during the reporting period:

1. Extension of PX closing hours from 1800 to 1930 to allow greater utilization during off duty hours.

2. An instant awards program was established to provide immediate recognition for deserving soldiers, thereby enhancing unit esprit de corps. Items such as watches and lighters, with appropriate unit crest, are being used as awards.

3. A program to establish additional annexes of the NCO Club system within unit areas has been initiated. This will provide additional morale and welfare services to the soldiers.

4. A program for one day tours to Nha Trang for individuals stationed in the Cam Ranh Bay area has had a positive effect on morale.

(3) Civil Affairs:

(a) During the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969 a total of 46 units of this command participated in 243 projects; 54 of these projects were completed with the majority being of a continuous nature.

(b) USASUPCOM-CRB contributed \$32,412 in supplies and equipment in direct support of the GVN Recovery Program. This included direct support to the victims of aggression and support to the GVN in their pacification and nation building efforts.

(c) PSYOPS activities during the month of December were abundant because of the Christmas holidays. USASUPCOM-CRB, with support from the United States gave toys and candies to approximately 1,400 children from several hamlets in this area. This distribution of gifts was well organized and no children were left out of the festivities, thus the entire effort went over very successfully. The entire command was marked by numerous small Christmas parties that met with equal success.

(d) During this period an extensive campaign was undertaken to insure the economic growth of Cam Ranh Village. The major effort during this period was the construction of the Village Fishing Pier. This is an example of the types of Community Relations Projects the USASUPCOM-CRB has undertaken. At this point in time, all piles are in place, and the decking of the pier will start immediately. When completed, the pier will extend approximately 750 feet from the shore.

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(c) A most beneficial project is the donation of edible garbage to the local Swine Raisers Cooperative for use as swill at their hog farm. This activity is improving the economy and the protein production in Cam Ranh City area.

(f) Of significant importance for the population of Cam Ranh Village were the series of Health Classes conducted by the 61st Medical Battalion. These classes were particularly effective because the films were in Vietnamese, emphasizing good health and hygiene practices.

(g) Loudspeaker missions flown in support of PSYOPS activities:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u># LEAFLETS</u>	<u>LDSPKR TIME</u>	<u>MESSAGE</u>
6 Nov 68	CO 005 498	240,000	45 mins	Chieu Hoi
7 Nov 68	CO 005 498	240,000	45 mins	Chieu Hoi
11 Nov 68	CO 010 650	80,000	60 mins	Chieu Hoi

(4) Adjutant General:

(a) Awards and Decorations: During this quarter, the following awards were processed by this command and forwarded to 1st Logistical Command for approval, except Certificates of Achievement, which are approved at this headquarters.

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Legion of Merit	2	3	1	6
Bronze Star Medal	43	63	66	172
Air Medal	1	1	1	3
Army Commendation Medal	33	59	68	160
Purple Heart	1	1	0	2
Certificate of Achievement	38	22	21	81
	<u>118</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>157</u>	<u>424</u>

(b) Reenlistments: See Inclosure 1.

(c) Testing Status: See Inclosure 2.

(d) Congressional Inquiries received within the command by month:

	<u>Number Received</u>	<u>Interim Replies</u>	<u>Final Replies</u>
November	29	16	20
December	29	20	34
January	30	25	26

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b. ACoS, Security, Plans and Operations

(1) Security and Intelligence:

(a) Clearance Actions: During the reporting period, a total of 451 requests for personnel security actions were received and a total of 466 clearances were granted or validated. As of 31 January 1969, 52 clearance actions were pending. An annual review of command clearance actions was completed in late December. A composite clearance roster for Headquarters Cam Ranh Bay Support Command was published on 11 December 1968.

(b) Document Security: A 100% inventory of secret documents maintained in the ACoS, SP&O repository was completed on 26 November 1968 due to a change in document custodian. All documents were accounted for. Scheduled 10% inventories of secret documents were conducted on 18 November 1968, 22 December 1968 and 31 January 1969.

(c) Ground Defense: On 24 December 1968, the Commanding Officer, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay was designated Installation Coordinator and Installation Defense Coordinator for the Cam Ranh peninsula. On 30 January 1969, an integrated ground defense plan for the peninsula was published and distributed to major US Army, Air Force and Naval Commands on Cam Ranh peninsula. Plans for a Joint Defense Operations Center to be manned on tri-service basis were completed. Implementation of these plans began in early January 1969. Concurrent with the planning and implementation of a peninsula ground defense plan, a new ground defense plan for the Army sectors of responsibility was developed and published. The target date for full implementation of these plans is 15 March 1969.

(d) Intelligence Reporting: On 31 December 1968, USASIPCOM-CRB Regulation 318-5, Intelligence Spot Reports, was published and disseminated to all subordinate commands. This regulation standardizes the format and procedures for reporting intelligence information and has significantly reduced the time required for intelligence spot reports to reach 1st Log Command and Hq, IFFV from elements subordinate to US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay.

(2) Plans and Training:

(a) Replacement Training:

1. Average monthly attendance at Replacement Training classes was reduced to 675 from last quarter's average of 800. Continuous command interest is being stressed to insure that all untrained personnel are scheduled for Replacement Training.

2. The following courses of instruction were conducted during the past quarter.

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Course

Dates

Project Counter IV PLL Tng	1-20 Oct 68
AN/GRC-50 Maintenance Tng	16-30 Dec 68
AN/GRC-106 Maintenance Tng	24 Dec 68 - 9 Jan 69
Packaging & Preservation Tng	6-17 Jan 69

(b) Force Development:

1. During the reporting period these units were reassigned to the Qui Nhon Support Command:

119th TC Co TML Svc (UIC CP7)
136th CS Co Lt Mnt DS (UIC CZD)
226th CS Co S&S DS (UIC DMJ)
529th TC Co Lt Trk 2nd T (UIC DFK)
545th TC Co Lt Trk 5T (UIC FS9)
853d SC Det MBL RAD RB (UIC FDL)

2. One attachment was made to Qui Nhon SIFCOM of the 525th CM Company Petrol Depot on 1 Dec 68.

3. During the reporting period the following units were gained by this Command:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTH STR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>GAINED FROM</u>	<u>ASG TO</u>
32d TC Plt	1/0/59-60	CRB	Activation	500 TC Gp
59th Ord Co	3/2218-233	CRB	Activation	191 Ord Bn
70th Trans CGO DOC (UIC G66)	0/0/9-9	CRB	Activation	124 TC Comd
158th Trans Det CGO DOC (UIC CRU)	0/0/9-9	CRB	Activation	124 TC Comd
194th CM Det (Air Drop Svc)	1/1/36-38	CRB	Activation	124 TC Comd
234th TC Plt (Lt Trk)	1/0/49-50	CRB	Prog 6 1st Log	124 TC Comd
362d Trans Det CGO (UIC EBV)	0/0/9-9	CRB	Activation	124 TC Comd
377th CS Co (Lt Maint)	4/3/136-143	CRB	Prog 6 1st Log	69th Mnt Bn
377th Trans Det CGO (UIC EKS)	0/0/9-9	CRB	Activation	124 TC Comd
378th Trans Det CGO (UIC EKT)	0/0/9-9	CRB	Activation	124 TC Comd
495th Trans Det CGO (UIC DR6)	0/0/9-9	CRB	Activation	124 TC Comd
603d Trans Det CGO (UIC DTB)	0/0/9-9	CRB	Activation	124 TC Comd
611th Trans Det CGO (UIC DTK)	0/0/9-9	CRB	Activation	124 TC Comd
613th Trans Det CGO (UIC DTM)	0/0/9-9	CRB	Activation	124 TC Comd
651st Trans Det CGO (UIC GR6)	0/0/9-9	CRB	Activation	124 TC Comd

4. During the period the following units of this command were INACTIVATED:

16th TC Co (UIC FQ8) 4/1/202-207
123d TC Co (UIC CP8) 6/0/323-329
147th FS Co (UIC DQ4) 8/0/297-305

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253d TC Det (UIC F08) 0/1/30-31
623d QM Co (UIC CBQ) 5/3/141-149

(c) Plans:

1. T-Day Planning - The Command T-Day Planner, although assigned to the command group, operated in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans and Operations to facilitate staff coordination. During the reporting period, four major planning documents from higher headquarters were reviewed and comments/recommendations furnished which reflected minimum essential personnel, equipment and construction requirements for this command.

2. Reorganization

a. Headquarters USASUPCOM-CRB reorganized on 1 January 1969 in accordance with the TASTA-70 concept. The former organization consisted of three assistant chiefs of staff (Compt, SP&O and Pers/Admin) and seven commodity/functional directorates (Ammo, Food, Gen Sup, Maint, POL, Retro & Disposal and Trans). The new organization consists of eight assistant chiefs of staff (Compt, SP&O, Pers, Sup, Maint, Svc, Trans and Ammo). Staff supervision of subsistence and POL supply has been placed under the ACoS/Supply. Staff supervision over food service is assigned to the ACoS/Services. The new headquarters organization facilitates coordination with Headquarters, 1st Log Comd and other Support Commands, and is substantially more responsive to requirements to support tactical operations.

b. A reorganization of major subordinate commands occurred on 1 January 1969 resulting in the inactivation of the US Army Transportation Command (Prov) and Cam Ranh Bay Subarea Command. This reorganization tailored the command's major subordinate headquarters to the mission and functions required to provide improved support to the Southern II Corps area. The 124th TC Command operates the Cam Ranh Bay Marine terminal and provides limited port and beach clearance at three outlying locations. The 500th TC Group serves as the command and control element for the wholesale mission, i.e., 36th Trans Bn (Mtr)(Line Haul), 191st Ordn Bn (Ammo), and the 262d QM Bn (POL). Cam Ranh Post replaces Cam Ranh Bay Subarea Command and provides, post, camp and station support for Army units located on the Cam Ranh Peninsula. The US Army Depot, Cam Ranh is responsible for providing wholesale Class I, II, IV and IX support. The 24th General Support Group commands and controls the five LSA's and provides direct and limited general support for divisional and non-divisional units within this command's area of responsibility.

(3) Operations: The following tactical operations were supported by USASUPCOM-CRB during the period of this report:

(a) Operation McLain: A search and destroy operation which began 15 July 1968 and continues in the Southern Provinces of II CTZ, with Headquarters, Task Force South, located in Dalat, by the 3d Battalion, 503d

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Infantry Brigade; and 173rd Airmobile Infantry Brigade supported by the 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery. This operation was supported by the following Logistical Operations.

1. LSA Phan Thiet - This Logistical Support Activity continues to provide supply point distribution of Class I, III, IV supplies; unit distribution of fast moving II and IV items; laundry, bath and graves registration services and direct support maintenance.

2. LSA Bao Loc - Originally designated as Task Force Tomblinson, it continues to provide the same type of services as LSA Phan Thiet.

(b) Operation Bolling: A search and destroy operation began on 19 September 1968 and continues in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa Provinces by the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173rd Infantry Battalion (Abn). On 1 December 1968 support of the operation was assumed by ONH SUPCOM with the realignment of boundaries.

(c) Operation MacArthur South: A search and destroy operation began on 13 July 1968 and continues in Darlac Province by the 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. This operation is supported by LSA Ban Me Thuot with supply point distribution of Class I, III and V supplies, unit distribution of fast moving II and IV items, laundry, bath and graves registration services and limited direct support maintenance.

(d) Americal Division. During the reporting period, this command continued to serve as the primary depot for Class V and bulk Class IV supplies in support of the Americal Division operating in Northern II Corps Tactical Zone while USASUPCOM-ONH supported other commodity requirements.

(e) Republic of Korea Army Operations in II Corps Tactical Zone (South) continues to be supported primarily by supply point distribution of Class I, III and V supplies from Phan Rang LSA, 54th General Support Group and Cam Ranh Post; and unit distribution of Class II and IV items from US Army Depot CR.

(f) Air Drop Operations: During the reporting period the 109th Aerial Delivery Company conducted no air drops due primarily to reduced enemy activity in RVN. Unit operations during this period consisted of rehabilitation of all pre-rigged stocks, reorganization of the rigging areas, retrograde of excess air items, maintenance and packing of cargo and aviation parachutes. In addition, a 1528 Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System capability was established for the delivery of supplies. Personnel of the 109th were also used for the support of depot operations in the Class I and Project Count areas. During the reporting period the 623rd TM Company (AFR&D) was inactivated removing the capability for field maintenance of air items from the command. The 194th TM Detachment (Air Drop and Service) was

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activated to provide personnel for requisitioning, receipt, storage, and issue of Quartermaster air drop equipment for an airborne force equivalent to an Airborne Division plus service supporting troops. The 109th and 194th continue to remain in a high state of readiness for support of tactical operations throughout RVN.

(4) Logistical Operations: USASUPCOM-CRB continued its assignment mission of back-up support of all classes of supplies to the other Support Commands in 1st Logistical Command.

(a) This Command moved an unprecedented amount of cargo by long line haul operations:

<u>No. Convoys</u>	<u>Destination</u>	<u>S/T Dry Cargo</u>	<u>Gallons POL</u>
18	Ban Me Thuot	5424	1,305,000
10	Bao Loc	3353	700,000
7	Dalat	1967	400,000
1	Phan Thiet	92	None

This represents an increase of over 13% over the previous reporting period in S/T of dry cargo moved by line haul assets. All convoy planning, to include security, cargo priorities, monitoring of bookings and allocation of transportation assets were controlled from the Logistical Operations Control Center (LOCC). Each convoy was inspected by a member of this headquarters prior to departure. Sectors and end destinations were notified telephonically for security purposes to insure smooth offloading to create a rapid turnaround.

(b) During this report period the Logistical Operations Control Center coordinated a total of 27 Combat Essential and Emergency Resupply Air Missions which represents a significant reduction in the number of missions from the previous quarter (54). This can be primarily attributed to the leveling off of requirements for Bao Loc and Ban Me Thuot Logistical Support Activities, and improved management of resources.

(c) The Logistical Operations Control Center continued to monitor all shipments and receipt of Duffel Bag equipment, advise the Commander on Duffel Bag operations, and determine the solution to problems which develop in the program. The Duffel Bag Facility, operated by the 128th Signal Co., continued to provide maintenance and assembly support of sensor operations for tactical units in RVN. There were 117 Duffel Bag shipments to 22 tactical units during the reporting period. Plans for maintenance program for future sensor operations were developed and personnel requirements determined during this period. This program, still in its infancy, is proving to be one of the most successful yet to be tested against the enemy.

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c. ACoS, Comptroller

(1) Thirteen students attended the fourth Introduction to Automatic Data Processing course conducted by the Army Education Center on 7-9 Jan 69.

(2) The Command and Control Improvement Program was established in the Support Command on 15 Jan 69.

(3) During the month of January the procedure for publishing the monthly Review and Analysis was revised. Under the new system five copies of the Review and Analysis are updated each month vis-a-vis cutting and printing multilith mats on a monthly basis.

(4) USASUPCOM-CRB Regulation 37-13 was revised in January. This regulation deals with the processing of reimbursable issue documents generated by Interservice Support Agreements (ISSAs).

(5) USASUPCOM-CRB Regulation 335-15 was written during January. This regulation gives procedures for controlling reports throughout the Command.

d. ACoS, Ammunition

(1) Class V stockage Objectives, management levels, and quantities on hand at the beginning and end of period in short tons.

(a) Statistics:

<u>Location</u>		<u>Beginning</u>	<u>End</u>
Phan Thiet LSA	S/O	738	869
	M/L	NA	654
	O/H	607	785
Ban Me Thout LSA	S/O	853	748
	M/L	NA	557
	O/H	1,044	704
Bao Loc LSA	S/O	377	372
	M/L	NA	272
	O/H	641	268
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	S/O	59,233	30,636
	M/L	NA	24,508
	O/H	76,096	39,419

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(b) Discussion:

1. Stockage objectives are based on weapons densities, usage rates published in USARPAC Regulation 710-15, issue experience, and storage capacity. The Cam Ranh Bay stockage objective includes 15 days of I Corps 60 day requirement.

2. In comparing stockage objectives at the beginning and end of the period, it should be pointed out that a different method of computation went into effect on 20 December 1968. Previously, the stockage objective was looked upon as the level around which supply should be sustained. Under the current method, the stockage objective is the upper limit with the management level as the level for maintaining supplies.

3. The stockage objective for the Phan Thiet LSA consists of a 7 day safety level computed using weapons densities and the Intensive Combat Rate (ICR) based on issue experience gained during the period Feb-July 1968, and an 8 day operating level. The operating level is computed using weapons densities and the Theater Sustaining Rate (TSR) which is based on issue experience of May-Nov 68. The Phan Thiet Stockage Objective is expected to decrease during the coming quarter due to the elimination of 155mm ammunition from stockage.

4. The stockage objective for the Ban Me Thuot LSA is based on a 6 day safety level and an 8 day operating level. It is expected to remain relatively stable during the coming quarter.

5. The Bao Loc LSA stockage objective is computed utilizing 5 days supply at the ICR and 8 days supply at the TSR. It was lowered due to issue experience for the last quarter and is expected to remain stable during the coming quarter.

(2) Total storage capacity at the beginning and end of period in short tons:

(a) Statistics:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Beginning</u>	<u>End</u>
Phan Thiet LSA	1,750	1,750
Ban Me Thuot LSA	1,960	2,500
Bao Loc LSA	2,318	2,201
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	76,127	76,127

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(b) Discussion: Storage capability is based on the planning factor of 1 short ton per 14 square feet of storage space. This planning factor is used upon direction of 1st Logistical Command, and represents a change from the factor of 1 short ton per 11 square feet used in previous reports. Planned construction in ASA "Charlie" at Cam Ranh Bay during this fiscal year, will increase the storage capacity by approximately 19,000 short tons.

(3) Quantities of Class V received and issued in short tons:

Location	Nov		Dec		Jan	
	<u>Rec</u>	<u>Iss</u>	<u>Rec</u>	<u>Iss</u>	<u>Rec</u>	<u>Iss</u>
Phan Thiet LSA	823	1,120	811	877	1,158	987
Ban Me Thuot LSA	329	847	520	755	554	689
Bao Loc	244	423	294	351	149	333
Cam Ranh Bay ASD	13,725	15,088	14,718	6,233	3,679	25,112

e. ACoS, Supply

(1) On 19 December 1968 the Director of General Supply was reorganized into the Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply. The Directorships of POL and Food were incorporated into the ACoS Supply office as divisions. There are now four (4) divisions in ACoS Supply - Subsistence, POL, General Supply and Plans and Operations.

(2) Project Rapid Arrow was brought to a successful conclusion and Rapid Arrow II was initiated for continual resupply of MACV units on a regular basis. G4, MACV II Corps stated that the Support Command provided outstanding support for Project Rapid Arrow.

(3) Project Count I was concluded with the Depot showing an inventory accuracy of approximately 92% and location accuracy 88%. While below the First Log standards of 95% in both areas, remarkable improvement was generated through Project Count I.

(4) Project STOP/SEE continued to stop the entrance of items that were already in an excess position in RVN. A total of 24,262 short tons were frustrated at the Cam Ranh Bay Port for this quarter. This project is continuing.

(5) Support of Tuy Hoa was changed from this support command to Qui Nhon Support Command as of 25 November 1968. Subsistence, ammunition support continued throughout the quarter from this command to Tuy Hoa.

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The transfer of all Tuy Hoa logistical support functions to the Qui Nhon Support Command will be completed in March 1969.

(6) During this period, the three former Subarea Commands (Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh Bay) and the Logistical Support Activity at Phan Rang continued to maintain a sufficient level of supplies necessary to meet all demands. This is due to daily utilization of Highway QL-1 which has remained open, except for Tuy Hoa which is resupplied by air.

(7) In December, daily air shipments of milk were initiated to III Corp area stations at Vung Tau, Phoc Vinh and Can Tho. Approximately 6,179 gallons of milk were shipped daily in this manner to assist USASUPCOM-SGN.

(8) On 1 January 1969, with the reorganization of the USASUPCOM-CRB, Cam Ranh Post assumed CRBSAC's mission of supporting the Phan Thiet LSA. Bao Loc LSA and Da Lat LSA continued to be supported by Phan Rang LSA. The Depot supported Ban Me Thuot until 22 January when the mission was transferred to the 54th General Support Group.

(9) A menu substitution was initiated to purge the system of all canned meats. The primary emphasis is still on consumption of perishable meats.

(10) Dow containers continue to be used for perishable ration shipments. This method, to date, is the best method for air shipment of perishable rations.

(11) During this period, action was initiated to relocate and improve the Ban Me Thuot LSA Class I yard.

(12) The program factor was reduced for perishable and non-perishable requisitions in order to reduce excess stocks in Depot.

(13) The Cam Ranh Bay Marine Terminal Facility has successfully undergone all required tests and has been accepted with deficiencies and placed into operation. The facility provides a rapid means of off loading and back loading product. Larger tankers may now be accommodated. Product is now transferred by pipeline to the Navy facility at Market Time instead of by 5,000 gallon tank trucks which were required to make 14 deliveries per week.

(14) New Stockage Objectives, Management Levels, and Safety Levels have been developed for each Class III Terminal and Supply Point to provide realistic management parameters to insure that adequate amounts of fuel are on hand at all times.

(15) A roll on/roll off method for the resupply of AVGAS, MOGAS, and DIESEL Fuel has been initiated at Phan Thiet using 5,000 gallon tanker vehicles. This will reduce the possibility of fuel contamination and

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prolong the life of these tank vehicles normally used on line hauls. JPL will continue to be supplied by Y-boat (coastal shuttle tanker).

f. ACoS, Maintenance

(1) The 377th Light Maintenance Company arrived at Cam Ranh Bay during November and was assigned to the 69th Maintenance Battalion. The company became operational without significant problems and assumed the mission of the 557th Light Maintenance Company for support of units in the Cam Ranh area.

(2) The 557th Light Maintenance Company was assigned the mission of providing maintenance support for all USA's of this support command with the exception of Ban Me Thuot. The mission of providing forward support was consolidated in one company to permit reorganization of the company to best fill the unusual requirements of the mission.

(3) During December the 136th Light Maintenance Company was transferred to Qui Nhon Support Command along with the support mission for the Tuy Hoa area. The transfer of the Tuy Hoa area to Qui Nhon eliminated a serious command and control problem caused by the distance and poor lines of communication from Cam Ranh to Tuy Hoa.

(4) A quarterly service program was initiated in November for all M107/110 self-propelled artillery. Each gun is scheduled for a complete service each quarter. Crew maintenance training is conducted in conjunction with the service.

(5) Maintenance personnel conducted an intensive campaign during the quarter to obtain valid equipment density reports from each unit supported. By late January densities had been received from nearly 100% of the units supported. These densities were the most accurate yet obtained by this command.

g. ACoS, Transportation

(1) Transfer of Vung Ro Bay to Qui Nhon - Effective 1 December 1968, the Vung Ro Bay Outport was transferred to the control of Qui Nhon Support Command. The HHD of the 24th Trans Bn (Tml) was transferred from Vung Ro Bay to Cam Ranh Bay, while the balance of battalion personnel and equipment remained at Vung Ro Bay.

(2) Reorganization and Splitting of US Army Trans Comd (Prov) - Effective 1 January 1969, the US Army Transportation Command (Prov) was split up, resulting in the following reorganization of subordinate commands with transportation missions:

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(a) 124th Trans Comd (Tml A) - Includes 10th Trans Bn (Tml), 24th Trans Bn (Tml) and stevedore, tug, ferry and intransit yard contractors. All port and beach motor transport now comes under the 124th Trans Comd (Tml A), and is performed by the 24th Battalion.

(b) 500th Transportation Group - Includes 36th Battalion (Trk), 191st Ordnance Bn and the 262d QM Bn (Petrl). All line haul capability is now under the 500th Trans Gp.

(3) Rail - The Vietnamese Railroad System is transporting an ever increasing amount of US Military Cargo between Phan Rang, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh Bay. The opening of the rail line from Phu Cat to Phan Rang has allowed more flexibility in choosing rail cargo and destinations. The US Military cargo shipped by rail from Cam Ranh Bay has increased from 421 short tons in November to 1,048 short tons in January.

(4) LST Ramp at Phan Thiet - Construction on the LST Ramp at Phan Thiet has begun. Completion of this project will mean greatly improved accessibility to the beach by LST, overcoming a sand bar which has been a continuous obstacle. Accessibility by LST will relieve LCU's presently being committed to Phan Thiet and offer the greater tonnage capability of LST's.

(5) Barging Rail Cargo To Ba Ngoi - This operation saves highway assets and is very advantageous for higher density cargo. Vinnell unloads the barges at Ba Ngoi and loads the cargo onto rail cars.

(6) BDL Page RO/RO Operations - The use of the BDL Page as RO/RO vessel to Nha Trang, Phan Rang and Phan Thiet cuts down on convoys, and permits line haul concentration on the longer haul, inland destinations. The RO/RO operation also permits faster turnaround and saves wear and tear on tractors and trailers.

(7) Staging Areas - A new hardstand staging area adjacent to pier 5 was completed on 18 January, which will permit the staging of approximately 10,000 short tons of cargo in support of both deep and shallow draft operations. The South Beach Operations and Documentation building was moved, and the hill is being cleared to provide for an additional 4000 short ton of staging capability.

(8) Staging Cargo - A new and concerted effort began during the period toward planned staging of cargo for incoming vessels to reduce turnaround times and preclude truck delay. Action was also taken to outload intransit Nha Trang and Phan Rang cargo directly from ship to barge, reducing double handling.

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(9) The following records were broken during the reporting period:

(a) 24 hour tonnage handled - 15,659 short tons from 311800 Dec 68 to 011800 Jan 69.

(b) Deep draft outload for January - 49,290 short tons (exceeding old record set in May 1968 by 8,209 short tons)

(c) Shallow draft outload for January - 52,766 short tons (exceeding December 1968 record by 7,506 short tons)

(10) Shipments by Mode Compared - Last Quarter and this Quarter (In short tons).

	<u>Aug - Oct</u>	<u>Nov - Jan</u>
Water	161,700	209,300
Hwy	34,900	30,300
Air	26,900	15,400
Rail	250 (Oct Shipment only)	1,800

The increase in water transport and the initiation of rail effort has replaced a large part of the line haul to Nha Trang and Phan Rang. Air has suffered somewhat due to weather and airfields being intermittently operative.

h. ACoS, Services

(1) Property Disposal

(a) Retrograde - During the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969 the total short tons of Retrograde material processed by USASUPCOM-CRB units were as shown below

<u>Materiel</u>	<u>On Hand Beginning Of Quarter</u>	<u>Received</u>	<u>Shipped</u>	<u>On Hand End Of Quarter</u>
Station Returns	0	0	0	0
Depot Excess	3,971	20,304	23,514	667
Reparables (Less Marine)	2,879	11,512	8,094	6,297
Unserviceable & Excess Ammo	1,454	7,407	6,455	2,406
Reuseable Ammo				
Components	902	908	1,574	236
Marine Reparables	289	4,205	3,787	707
TOTAL (Short Tons)	9,501	44,335	43,524	10,313

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(b) Disposal: During the period 1 November 1968 through 28 January 1969, the two property disposal yards within the command processed 761 short tons of usable property and 1,258 short tons of scrap. Approximately 986 short tons of usable property was reissued to various units within the command, while remaining property was listed for sale. All scrap metal on hand at the disposal yards belongs to Stainless Processing Company, Chicago, Illinois. Financial arrangements have been completed and Stainless Processing Company has begun removing scrap. During the period 272 short tons of property has been removed from the disposal yards and sold with a net return of \$79,021.00 to the Government.

(2) Field Services Division

(a) Graves Registration: The remains of 127 US Armed Forces personnel and Free World Military Assistance Forces personnel were processed through USASUPCOM-CRB collecting points during the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969.

(b) Laundry and Bath:

1. Utilization of contract laundry service increased as additional pressing units, driers, and a large boiler plant were installed at the Modern Services Plant in Nha Trang. A supplemental agreement has been incorporated into the contract whereby the US Government will provide electrical power for the laundry plant on a reimburseable basis.

2. Field laundry and bath operations continued at LSA's located at Ban Me Thuot, Bao Loc, Phan Rang and Phan Thiet. One-third of the command's laundry and bath assets are deployed at Logistical Support Areas.

(3) Engineer

During the period 1 November 1968 through 31 January 1969, this Division has worked with the Civil Affairs Officer in designing a pier and streets for the Cam Ranh Village. Construction was begun on the pier with equipment and men from the 35th Engineer Group. Also during this period this Division was responsible for the engineer effort for Operation Holley. This consisted of electrical wiring lighting, construction of a parking area, fencing, and construction of electrical equipment stand.

(4) Food Service Section

(a) During the month of November 1968 the bakery facility operated by the Tuy Hoa Subarea Command was shut down and the equipment was reassigned to the bakery plants in Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang. It was determined and proven that two bakery plants could fulfill troop requirements.

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(b) During the month of November 1968 the "Best Mess Award" was replaced by the "Star Plaque Award" thus enabling more mess facilities to qualify for recognition.

(c) During the reporting period fifty-six 1st Logistical Command facilities were inspected by Food Services Supervisors from this Headquarters.

i. Signal

(1) On 14 November 1968, the Communication Center was officially opened for use within the 1st Logistical Command teletype net. The CommCenter operates a secure, full-duplex terminal and provides for message traffic to 1st Log Command, ICC Vietnam, and the Support Commands at Ohi Nhon and Da Nang. The center is operational 24-hours a day and as approved by the United States Army Security Agency on 14 December 1968, can pass traffic up to secret classification.

(2) With the additional radio operators that were obtained during November 1968, it is now possible to monitor and control two separate convoys moving in opposite directions at the same time. A separate net was established with IFFV so that information from the convoy monitoring teams can be relayed to IFFV from this office, thus increasing both the operational control and the security of the convoys.

(3) The age and condition of the original two 3/4 radio trucks resulted in numerous break downs and almost insurmountable maintenance problems causing convoy delays and rescheduling. Since replacements were not available, two new M-151 1/2 ton trucks with 60 AMP alternators were substituted with the radio equipment reconfigured to fit in a small 3-sided plywood shelter. This shelter contains 2 ea AN/GRC-106 and 2 ea AN/VRC-53 radio sets which are operated simultaneously in 4 different radio nets. This configuration has proven entirely satisfactory with each vehicle averaging over 1,000 miles per month of convoy travel over some of the worst roads in Vietnam.

(4) The administrative single side-band radio communications network with phone patch service was placed on a 24-hour operational basis in November 1968. The total phone patches handled by the entire net in the 2nd quarter was 3114, an increase of almost 50% over the 1st Quarter of Fiscal Year 1969.

j. Provost Marshal

(1) The office of the Provost Marshal was established and became operational on 1 November 1968. Lieutenant Colonel Roy A. Kennington was appointed Provost Marshal the same date.

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(2) Serious Incidents Reports (SIR) received and processed during the period 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969 totaled 186. All SIR's are screened for intelligence value.

(3) During the period 1 Nov - 31 Jan reports prepared from information received through Military Police Channels reflected the following statistical information:

- (a) Crimes against persons and property - 94.
- (b) Military Offense Incidents - 323.
- (c) Miscellaneous Offenses - 106.
- (d) Traffic violation offenses - 467.

(4) Physical Security: Several significant improvements were made during the reporting period.

(a) US Army Depot Cam Ranh assumed limited access status on 6 November 1968. All through roads were blocked and one gate was established for cargo checks. Depot areas were fenced and a Security Guard Platoon was attached to provide interior guard.

(b) The 124th Transportation Command improved the fencing in the port area. New guard stations were built and relocated to provide more positive control. Towers were constructed on piers to provide better observation and defense against possible swimmer saboteurs.

(c) An additional two companies of Security Guards were requested to provide required security. This will release mission personnel to perform logistical functions who are presently fulfilling guard requirements on a rostered basis.

(d) A new fence was constructed around the perimeter of Cam Ranh Village. Additional guards were added for security of power ships and the Myca bridge which links the peninsula to the mainland.

(e) An agreement was signed by the Army, Navy and Air Force which established procedures for the control of local nationals and third country national employees, the checking and registering of vehicles, and coordinated police patrols for the Cam Ranh Peninsula.

k. Staff Judge Advocate

(1) Legal Assistance: Legal assistance to military and civilian personnel in the Cam Ranh Bay Area increased somewhat from the last reporting period to 1,488 cases. The following is a break-down by category.

- (a) Adoption and Change of names - 21.
- (b) Citizenship and Immigration - 18.
- (c) Domestic Relations - 247.
- (d) Non-Support - 45.
- (e) Personal Finances - 91.

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- (f) Personal Property: 105
- (g) Taxation: 93
- (h) Torts: 71
- (i) Wills and Estates: 23
- (j) Miscellaneous: 756

(2) Military Justice: During the reporting period a total of 60 Special and 15 Summary Courts-Martial cases were advised, processed and reviewed by this office, 773 Article 15 punishments were checked for legal sufficiency and 59 appeals adjudicated.

(3) Legal Opinions: A total of 29 written opinions were rendered.

(4) Claims. A total of 26 claims under the Military Claims Act were received, of which 23 have been paid. Dollar amounts of claims processed are as follows:

- (a) Claims received: \$4,565.25
- (b) Claims paid: \$3,215.77

L. Information

During the period 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69, the Information Section submitted 83 News Releases, 118 Photo Releases, 2777 Home Town News Releases, and 263 Home Town Taped Interviews. The major significant activity of this period was the coverage of the Bob Hope Christmas Show. The Information Section erected a press tent and coordinated coverage of the event. The press tent was used as a center for all information activity of the representatives of the various Armed Forces. Audio-visual coverage of the show was complete. Backstage interviews and photos of celebrities and servicemen were obtained.

2. (U) Section II - Lessons Learned: Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

a. Personnel

(1) Civilianization:

(a) Observation: The limited labor market in the Cam Ranh Bay area continues to be a major problem. Program 6 units are over 90% full and have practically completed the program. To accomplish this it has been necessary to down grade some skilled positions to common labor type jobs and to hire all available labor regardless of qualifications. However, the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh still has 465 vacant direct hire positions, nearly all of which require skilled employees. Based on hiring trends

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in the past two months, it will take several more months before all denot positions can be filled. Based on the shortage of skilled labor which has always hindered civilianization in this area and the decline of any type of available labor in the past two months, it appears that the civilianization program for Cam Ranh Bay was adopted without regard to the local labor market.

(b) Evaluation: It is estimated that numerically, civilianization in Cam Ranh Bay Program 6 units will be completed in the near future and within six months in the US Army Denot, Cam Ranh. However, if completion of the program is based on a local national employee whose productivity equals that of a military counterpart, completion of the program will require several years of intensive training. The command is conducting several English language and job related training programs. However, progress is slow because of the language barrier. It is estimated that 4 to 8 months of intensive language training followed by job skills training will be required to produce a fully qualified tradesman or clerical worker. To date the USAPV Civilian Personnel Directorate has sent in instructors to conduct English and job related short courses. The command has also conducted several English and job related courses. English short courses are now a continuing training program offered by the support command. While the training conducted to date has been beneficial, it is not adequate to develop the employees English fluency to the degree required for skilled trade and clerical positions. The professional instructors sent in by USARV Civilian Personnel Directorate have conducted a few short courses and departed. The courses conducted by the support command are permanent but limited in scope because the instructors are not professional language instructors.

(c) Recommendations: That the USARV Civilian Personnel Directorate establish a permanent English language training program in Cam Ranh Bay. That higher headquarters assign a small number of Vietnamese-English linguists with teaching experience or training to the support command for the purpose of establishing full time language classes.

(2) Military Justice:

(a) Observation: Implementation of paragraph 10, AR 635-200 (Discharge for the Good of the Service) has been successfully accomplished. The above regulation permits an individual whose conduct has rendered him triable by court-martial for an offense punishable by Bad Conduct or Dishonorable Discharge, to request that he be discharged from the United States Army. An undesirable discharge certificate will normally be furnished if the request for discharge is granted.

(b) Evaluation: 1. Under the above regulation the following requirements must be fulfilled:

- a. Request for Discharge for the Good of the Service.

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b. Charge sheet, sworn to by the accuser and read to the accused by his company commander.

c. Statements and other documents fully substantiating the alleged crimes.

d. Only charges for which a Bad Conduct or Dishonorable Discharge can be adjudged will be alleged on the charge sheet.

e. Physical Examination and Psychiatric Examination.

2. This method of elimination is highly successful and more expeditious, where appropriate, than the more ponderous elimination procedure under AR 635-212.

(c) Recommendation: Where appropriate, continued use of the procedures under AR 635-200 vis-a-vis AR 635-212.

b. Operations

(1) Destruction of Unserviceable Ammunition.

(a) Observation: In the past, the period between the approval of ammunition condition reports and destruction of the ammunition has been up to four months. This was due to the fact that only FOD personnel were being utilized for destruction of ammunition on ACR's. The 191st Ord Bn formed their own demolition team for destroying unserviceable ammunition in the depot and at the LSA's.

(b) Evaluation: Ammunition on ACR's is being destroyed within a few days after they are approved. By having a demolition team at the 191st Ord Bn, the FOD Detachment can be made more readily available for other assignments.

(c) Recommendations: Recommend that this policy be continued.

(2) Signal

(a) Observation: Because of the distance and terrain that existed between this location and convoys, it was discovered that the authorized FM radio equipment was inadequate. AN/ARC 102 SSR and Collins FM-2 SSR transceivers were used, but both resulted in inadequate communications. Finally a single side band radio, AN/GRC-106, was tried. This radio proved most successful.

(b) Evaluation: Many problems which arise during convoy operations can be quickly resolved if communications exist between the convoy commander and his home station. Use of the AN/GRC-106 SSR radio set results in this desired communications.

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(c) Recommendation: That commands and units having responsibility for long haul convoys be authorized and supplied AN/GRC-106 SSR radio sets

(3) Property Disposal - Scales

(a) Observation: Discrepancies have been noted in the recorded weights of property removed by the contractors.

(b) Evaluation: Property sold from disposal facilities is measured by weight. The most accurate means of determining weights is by the use of truck scales. A sixty ton scale has been received by the Cam Ranh Disposal Facility, but it needs to be assembled.

(c) Recommendation: That measures be taken to have qualified personnel assemble and gauge these scales. Also that scales be provided to the Nha Trang Disposal Facility.

(4) Property Disposal - Construction Equipment

(a) Observation: Construction of the new property disposal facility at Cam Ranh Bay has been curtailed because of an inability to utilize construction equipment.

(b) Evaluation: Construction equipment is needed to prepare the new areas for utilization. Land cleaning is the greatest obstacle in opening the area.

(c) Recommendations: Construction equipment be assigned to complete the new property disposal facility.

(5) Use of Rail

(a) Observation: The use of rail increased significantly since its implementation in November 1968.

(b) Evaluation: Rail has great potential as a mode of transportation in RVN. The use of rail also releases other transportation assets for non-rail destinations and for non-rail compatible cargo.

(c) Recommendation: Maximum utilization of rail and further exploration of its possibilities should be continued.

(6) Staging of Cargo

(a) Observation: Planned staging of general cargo has reduced ship turnaround time and truck delays. Ammunition has also been staged on trailers in the ammunition area, trailer availability permitting.

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(b) Evaluation Cargo staging is a valuable concept in efficient port management.

(c) Recommendations The concerted effort to effectively stage cargo for outloading ships should be continued in order to maintain a turnaround times and to generally increase the efficiency of port operations.

(7) Organic Equipment

(a) Observation. The 124th Transportation Command (Tml A) continues to experience problems because of the lack of 60 ton mobile cranes and 60 ton lowboys. This equipment is necessary for the handling of heavy retrograde vehicles.

(b) Evaluation. In order to move this cargo the 124th Transportation Command (Tml A) must always borrow 60 ton mobile cranes and 60 ton lowboys on a favor and opportune basis from the Air Force or from Engineer units. Coordinating to borrow this equipment consumes time and delays the accomplishment of the port operation mission.

(c) Recommendation: The 124th Transportation Command (Tml A) be authorized and supplied 60 ton mobile cranes and 60 ton lowboys.

c. Training - None

d. Intelligence - None

e. Logistics

(1) Mixed Items (FSN's) in One Location

(a) Observation. During an inventory it was found that numerous single locations in storage warehouses and storage areas contained a multiple number of items.

(b) Evaluation. This method of storage although appearing to utilize available storage to a maximum extent introduces a high rate of error in the issue of the required item to the customer. This is particularly true when the items are similar both in FSN and in nomenclature.

(c) Recommendation. That all storage locations be purged of multiple items.

(2) Location File Accuracy

(a) Observation. Sample surveys have shown that locator file accuracy will average 97% and above when sampling is conducted from the file to the floor but will average 94% or less when sampling is conducted from the floor to the file.

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(b) Evaluation: The lack of accuracy concerning what is actually in a storage area is reflected in the discrepancy between the floor and the file when a sample location survey is made from floor to file. The inaccuracy of locations reduces the effectiveness to resupply items requested.

(c) Recommendation: Continuous sampling of locations must be made by the warehouseman to insure the maximum effective location accuracy. This survey must, of necessity, be from the floor location to the locator file. Immediate action must be taken on all "found" items to insure that locations are established in the locator file and that subsequent inventory is taken to insure the items are located in the Availability Balance File.

(3) Special Inventories.

(a) Observation: Often special inventories have been initiated which require completion and adjustment to the balance files in a very short period of time, sometimes within 48 hours.

(b) Evaluation: The results of expedited inventories are generally unreliable. From experience it can be stated that accelerated inventory will not be completely accurate, due to documentation in-float. Additionally, there is no assurance that location changes are posted accurately during the compressed processing time.

(c) Recommendation: That special inventories be conducted during a period of time not less than seven days. This extra time will greatly enhance the accuracy of inventory data used to manage supplies at the Inventory Control Center.

(4) Use of Dow Containers for Perishable Air Shipments.

(a) Observation: In the past, Dow Containers were placed on the 463L pallet latitudinally.

(b) Evaluation: This method filled up a C-130 aircraft from wheelwell to wheelwell. The only way to move from front to rear or vice versa was over the top of the container.

(c) Recommendation: That all Dow Containers be turned longitudinal

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on 463L pallets to facilitate free movement by the crew members.

(5) Bread Air Shipments.

(a) Observation: Bread arriving at LSA's has often been stale, even though it was shipped by air.

(b) Evaluation: The bread is shipped fresh from the bakery, but occasionally there is a delay in shipments from the air base. When this happens a surplus of bread builds up.

(c) Recommendation: That date of pack (DOP) be written on all bread containers for air shipment and aerial ports then ship containers with the oldest DOP first.

(6) Requisition Strength.

(a) Observation: In the past, there has been an overstockage of perishable (R) and non-perishable (S) rations due to an erroneous program factor.

(b) Evaluation: The program factor must be based on actual personnel subsisting on "R" and "S" rations, instead of total strength. This will help eliminate excess.

(c) Recommendation: That all requisitions, except MCI's, be based on actual strength subsisting on "R" and "S" rations, instead of total personnel strength.

(7) Transportation of Perishable Rations.

(a) Observation: At times, it is impossible to ship perishable rations by air or by highway due to inclement weather, non-availability of aircraft, the highway being closed, or enemy activity.

(b) Evaluation: When the above situations exist, it has been discovered that reefer vans placed on a ship as RO/RO work well.

(c) Recommendation: That a RO/RO ship continue to be made available for perishable ration shipments when necessary.

(8) Re-erection of 3,000 Barrel Tank at Phan Thiet: ~~Unseen.~~

(a) Observation: A 3,000 barrel bolted steel tank used in JP4 storage was disassembled at Phan Thiet for the dual purposes of eliminating the leakage of product and cleaning the interior of the tank.

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(b) Evaluation: The tank was cleaned and then re-erected, by an Engineer unit which neglected to use sealing compound. Upon completion and erection and during the testing of the tank, it was discovered that the tank seepage was greater than before.

(c) Recommendation: POL Storage tank re-erection should be accomplished by personnel qualified to perform the work or otherwise supervised by someone knowledgeable in the field. Valuable time and much needed storage capacity has been lost.

(9) Use of Commercial Petroleum Storage at Nha Trang.

(a) Observation: The criteria established for Stockage Objectives, Management Levels, and Safety Levels includes the use of commercial storage available for military use. The amount of commercial storage to be used is an agreement between the Subarea Petroleum Office, Vietnam, and the central office of the commercial contractors. These agreements have not been binding on local commercial managers at Nha Trang.

(b) Evaluation: Thru put charges for MACV owned fuel discharged into commercial tankage are approximately six times that charged for fuel discharged directly into military storage. Economically, commercial storage should be kept to the minimum. However, some commercial storage must be utilized to supply the ARVN Class III complex at Nha Trang and to provide limited back up for US Military Agencies.

(c) Recommendation: That the Subarea Petroleum Office, Vietnam, review requirements for commercial storage at Nha Trang, reduce the available quantity to the minimum required and ensure that the final agreement is binding on local managers.

(10) Organic Maintenance Capability.

(a) Observation: The 538th Land Clearing Company which began operations in this area during the quarter has experienced an excessive deadline rate.

(b) Evaluation: The 538th Land Clearing Company arrived in this support command on short notice and without organic maintenance capability. The type and quantity of equipment involved required repair parts and mechanics not available in this command in adequate numbers. The heavy concentration of specialized engineer construction equipment requires a support unit specialized in engineer construction equipment.

(c) Recommendation: That Land Clearing Companies be deployed with organic direct support capability and an adequate stockage of repair parts.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
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(11) Generators for Laundry Units.

(a) Observation: The 10 KW Generator set issued with the Eidal Laundry Unit, M532, is insufficient for the load requirement of the unit.

(b) Evaluation: Shut downs, due to generator over load causes danger to the operator and equipment in that fuel in the burner on both the water heater and air heater on the dryer will vaporize. These vapors will back through the fan which is inoperative at this time and into the working area. Contact with a spark or flame will cause an explosion. If inadvertently the unit is started before the vapors have been completely purged, the spark on the air heater will arc at the electrodes and cause sparks which will ignite those vapors.

(c) Recommendation: Operating laundry unit be authorized the exchange of 10 KW Generators presently issued with Eidal Laundry Units (M532) for 15 KW Generators.

f. Organization - None

g. Other

(1) Religious Activities.

(a) Observation: Regularly scheduled religious services in chapels alone were not adequately meeting the spiritual needs of the soldiers in this command.

(b) Evaluation: Since initiating religious services in work areas, more soldiers are attending religious services.

(c) Recommendation: Chaplains continue to conduct religious services in the motor pool and shop areas in addition to their regularly scheduled chapel services.

(2) Use of Detergents.

(a) Observation: A noticeable decrease in the effectiveness of the soap used by laundry facility has been observed.

(b) Evaluation: The effectiveness of the detergent decreases with age. Soap held in stock for long periods becomes ineffective.

(c) Recommendation: Emphasis should be placed on the proper rotation of stocks so that detergent is issued while it is within the effective life span.

AVCA CRB-IO

15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS: CSPOR -65) (U)


3. (U) Section III - Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey
Information: None.

~~5 Incl~~

as

Incl 1 - 5 wd Hq DA

TEL: CRB 3307


FRANK A. GLEASON, JR.
Colonel, CF
Commanding

AVCA GO-MH (15 Feb 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support
Command, Cam Ranh Bay for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65.

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 31 March 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters,
US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay for the quarterly period ending
31 January 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference paragraph 2a(1), page 20, concerning problems at Cam
Ranh in obtaining skilled personnel to fill vacant positions in the
Civilianization Programs. Concur. The lack of skilled VN civilians in
the Cam Ranh area hampers the efficient accomplishment of the depot's
mission. Action taken by the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, in the
establishment of permanent job-related courses is adequate for non-
skilled positions. However, English language proficiency is a key require-
ment for the skilled and clerical positions. This headquarters is
initiating a request to the Civilian Personnel Director, USARV, to pro-
vide English language instructors to US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay,
on a continuous basis.

b. Reference item concerning implementation of Chapter 10, AR 635-200,
pages 21 and 22, paragraph 2a(2). Concur in part.

(1) The evaluation is, in part, incorrect. Subparagraph 2a(2)(b)ld
is in error. All appropriate charges against an accused should be
alleged on the charge sheet regardless of whether a punitive discharge is
included in the maximum punishment for each offense. Subparagraph 2a(2)(b)le
is also in error. A psychiatric examination is not a mandatory requirement
and should only be used in appropriate circumstances. Where there is no
reasonable ground for belief that the accused is, or was at the time of
his misconduct, mentally defective, deranged, or abnormal, a statement to
that effect signed by the immediate commander meets the requirements of the
regulation (see paragraph 10-3c(5), AR 635-200).

(2) Paragraph 2a(2)(c) should not be construed to mean that commanders
should encourage an accused under their command to submit a request for
discharge. Action under Chapter 10, AR 635-200 is initiated by an accused
as his personal decision. Commanders will insure that there is no element
of coercion in submitting a request under the regulation (see paragraph
10-2, AR 635-200).

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31 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65.

(3) Initiating headquarters has been advised of the foregoing incorrect procedures.

c. Reference item concerning destruction of unserviceable ammunition, page 22, paragraph 2b(1). Concur. This is standard procedure for all ammunition organizations in country. All personnel with an ammunition MOS are trained in methods of destruction of unserviceable ammunition. The mission of an EOD section or detachment is to destroy hazardous ammunition, neutralize duds and like items and perform assigned missions on an on-call basis. The mission does not include destruction of unserviceable ammunition except in an advisory capacity. No action required by higher headquarters.

d. Reference item concerning AN/GRC-106 SSB radios, page 22, paragraph 2b(2). Concur. Units concerned are being advised to submit MTOE and temporary loan action to this headquarters IAW Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command Circulars 310-4 and 310-32.

e. Reference item concerning Property Disposal Scales, page 23, paragraph 2b(3). Concur. Disposal personnel at Cam Ranh Bay advise that a Job Order Request (DA Form 2701) has been submitted for the assembly and installation of the sixty ton truck scales. Scales for the Nha Trang disposal activity have been lifted aboard the SS Trans Columbia which has an ETA of 1 Mar 69 at Cam Ranh Bay.

f. Reference item concerning Property Disposal Construction Equipment, page 23, paragraph 2b(4). Concur. Disposal personnel at Cam Ranh Bay advise that necessary coordination has been made with the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command Engineer for assistance in this matter.

g. Reference item concerning 60 ton cranes and 60 ton lowboys for 124th Transportation Command, page 24, paragraph 2b(7). Concur. Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command Circular 310-4 and 310-32 inform subordinate commands of proper procedures for obtaining additional equipment.

h. Reference item concerning location file accuracy, page 24, para 2e(2). Nonconcur. The continuation of sampling locator surveys does not solve the problem. TM 743-200 states that when a sample survey shows the locator file to be inaccurate a complete locator survey should be made. Recommend that procedures TM 743-200 and Section IV, 1st Logistical Command 3SVN Standard Supply System for Class II and IV Depots be followed.

i. Reference item concerning special inventory, page 25, paragraph 2e(3). Nonconcur. The 1st Logistical Command 3SVN Standard Supply System

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does not establish a time limit for special inventories. However, seven days appear to be an excessive amount of time to inventory a single item. The intent and need for a special inventory is to determine the correct amount of stock available for a selected item as quickly as possible. This should always be accomplished in the shortest time possible with the least amount of delay, without sacrificing accuracy for speed.

j. Reference item concerning broad air shipments, page 26, paragraph 2e(5). Concur. This is at present being done.

k. Reference item concerning requisition strength, page 26, paragraph 2e(6). Concur. Recommendation that actual strength be used rather than total strength, is as directed by message this headquarters (C) 158C, DTG 090505Z, Feb 69.

l. Reference item concerning transportation of perishable rations, page 26, paragraph 2e(7), Transportation of Perishable Rations. Concur. RO/RO reefer vans can solve delivery problems under adverse conditions when these resources are available. However, RO/RO vessels may not always be available since only four MSTS vessels, and the BDL Page are presently equipped for this type of operation.

m. Reference item concerning re-erection of 3,000 barrel tank at Phan Thiet, page 26, paragraph 2e(8). Concur. Paragraph 81 of TM 10-1109 states that leaks in bolted steel tanks should be repaired by the installation of new gasket materials and bolts and by tightening the stave seams. Tank staves are easily damaged during tank disassembly; therefore, bolted steel tanks 3,000 barrels and larger should not be disassembled if further service is required of the tank. A new tank was required to replace the tank at Phan Thiet which was damaged during disassembly. As this is not the only instance of such damage to bolted steel tanks, recommend that the lesson learned from this incident be disseminated to USARV engineer units.

n. Reference item concerning use of commercial petroleum storage at Nha Trang, page 27, paragraph 2e(9). Nonconcur. The problem as stated has now been solved by removing the commercial storage at Nha Trang from required stockage level computations. It is not believed that any further action by SAPOV is required.

o. Reference item concerning Land Clearing Companies, page 27, paragraph 2e(10). Concur. AR 310-31 and 310-44 contain proper procedures for obtaining additional personnel and equipment.

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Command, Cam Ranh Bay for the Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65.


p. Reference item concerning generators for laundry units, page 28, paragraph 2e(11). Nonconcur. The 10 KW generator has sufficient power to efficiently operate the EIDAL Laundry Unit, M532. Only during the first few moments of the extraction cycle is the generator strained (red lined). Proper maintenance, and avoidance of over loading the 60 lb capacity of the unit should eliminate any shutdown. If inadvertently the laundry unit is overloaded, and shut down occurs, enough time should be allowed for the vapors to become purged without the use of the blower. Safety would not become a factor if the unit is not overloaded.

q. Reference item concerning religious activities, page 28, paragraph 2e(1). Concur. Recommendation is in accord with "Project Street Corner". The 1st Logistical Command Staff Chaplain has inaugurated a program of religious activities to be held in work areas where troops assemble. Comment made by CRB Support Command Chaplain represents initial phase in implementing "Project Street Corner".

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839


J. I. HAEFFELDER
Major, AGC
Asst AG

CF:

USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay

AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 69) 2d Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay
for the Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS: CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 9 APR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CSOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON

1LT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:

USA Spt Comd CRB

1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (15 Feb 69) 3d Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Spt Comd, Cam Ranh Bay, RVN
for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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